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RECONSIDERING RECUSALS: THE NEED
FOR REQUIREMENTS FOR WHEN NOT TO
RECUSE
Mason E. Lowe*
ABSTRACT
In the American judiciary system, it is imperative that judges
act free of bias. Although this seems to be an easy-enough-to-
understand theory, its practical application is not always so
simple. As a result, there have been wide-ranging, unpredictable,
and sometimes undesirable results. Others have noted the need
for clearer recusal rules and guidelines. There have been various
suggestions for how to improve or reform recusal rules, all of
which note that there is a lack of standardized and predictable
rules for when judges are required to recuse themselves. These
previous suggestions have correctly identified the root of the
problem and provided practical solutions to the problem of judges
improperly refusing to recuse themselves, but they have also
ignored a significant problem with the current landscape of
recusal law: an equal need of standardized guidance for when not
to recuse, an area not adequately considered to this point. This is
not just a hypothetical problem. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Comer v.
Murphy Oil shows, a judge's decision to recuse can be just as
detrimental, if not more so, than a judge's decision not to recuse.
This Article first briefly outlines the historical background of
and purpose behind recusals. It then discusses the odd-but
certainly potentially repeatable-procedural path of Murphy Oil,
which ultimately led to the dismissal of an appellant's victory as if
no appeal had ever taken place, explaining why this decision was
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comments of Professors Meredith Aden and Christopher Lund. Thank you also to
Ben Abel and Christopher Meredith for their outstanding research assistance. Any
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not only unsound but also symptomatic of a much larger recusal
problem. It next describes alternatives available to the Fifth
Circuit, including following the decision of the Fourth Circuit in a
similar case; although there were better options, the Fifth Circuit's
course of action was perfectly permissible under the law. Finally,
this Article explains why these conflicting decisions illustrate the
need for better recusal standards, including standards not only for
when judges must recuse themselves, but also for when judges
must not recuse themselves.
Others have theorized that recusal statutes and procedures
are systematically underused and underenforced." It is not just
underuse, however, that poses a problem. Although underuse can
deprive litigants of an impartial forum, overuse can be even more
problematic as it can deprive litigants not just of an impartial
forum, but any forum at all.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most basic cornerstones of the American judicial
system is that judges are the ultimate impartial arbiters. But
there is no absolute standard for what constitutes "impartiality"
when it comes to the judiciary or what actions a judicial officer
must take if there is some question about the judge's impartiality.
This is the case even if that judge is the very one harboring such
doubts about impartiality. To be sure, there are recusal statutes,
and 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) sets out specific factual instances when a
judge "shall . . . disqualify himself."' Not all of the circumstances
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455 are clear, however. For instance, 28
U.S.C. § 455(b) requires disqualification when a judge "has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," but does not
explain what constitutes a personal bias or prejudice sufficient to
require recusal.2 Even less clear is the requirement for recusal
when a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3
This lack of clarity and concrete guidance has led to wide-
ranging, unpredictable, and sometimes undesirable results, such
as in the cases discussed below. It has also led to critics noting
the need for more systematic and concrete recusal rules and
guidelines. 4  To date, suggestions for how to improve or reform
the recusal guidelines have included everything from providing
counsel with peremptory challenges of judges' to requiring
1. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006). To name a few, a judge must recuse when the judge
served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, the judge or the judge's spouse has a
financial interest in the income, the judge's spouse is a lawyer in the proceeding, or
the judge has personal knowledge of facts in dispute. Id.
2. See id. § 455(b)(1).
3. Id. § 455(a).
4. See, e.g., Brian Downing, Action, Accountability, and the Judiciary: United
States Federal Judicial Recusal Reform In a New Century, 1 MICH. J. POL. SCI. 33,
34-35 (2002); James Sample et al., Fair Courts: Setting Recusal Standards, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUST. (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1, 2008, at 5-7,
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy[Democracy/
Recusal%20Paper FINAL.pdf; Letter from Law School Professors and Deans on
Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for Supreme Court Justices to Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 17,
2011) [hereinafter Letter on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules], available at
http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/judicial-ethics-sign-on_1etter.pdf.
5. Sample et al., supra note 4, at 5, 26-27.
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written opinions when a judge denies a motion to recuse.6 The
suggestions differ in their approach to solving the problem, but
they are uniform in their diagnosis of the problem: the lack of
truly standardized and predictable rules for when judges are
required to recuse themselves.
Previous proposals have correctly identified the root of the
problem (a lack of clear rules) and provided practical solutions to
the problem of judges improperly refusing to recuse themselves,
but they have also ignored a significant problem with the current
landscape of recusal law. Recusal law is in need not only of
standardized guidance for when to recuse but also of
standardized guidance for when not to recuse, an area scholars-
and legislatures and courts-have not adequately considered to
this point. This is not just a hypothetical problem. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in
Comer v. Murphy Oil shows, a judge's decision to recuse can be
just as detrimental, if not more so, than a judge's decision not to
recuse.
In Murphy Oil, a Fifth Circuit judge's recusal-a procedural
tool designed to ensure fairness and impartiality-led to the
violation of the appellants' absolute, statutory right to appeal.'
As discussed below, the court in Murphy Oil effectively
eliminated the statutory right to appeal by voting to hear an
appeal en banc and then later deciding it could not consider the
appeal due to quorum issues as a result of one judge's recusal.9
As a result, the Fifth Circuit's original three-judge panel
appellate decision, which overturned the district court decision,
6. Letter on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules, supra note 4, at 2-3. To name
just a few more, there have also been proposals for per se recusal rules for campaign
contributors, independent adjudication of disqualification motions, and de novo
review on interlocutory appeal of a refusal to recuse. Sample et al., supra note 4, at
6, 29-33.
7. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-55 (5th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
8. See id.; see also United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 58 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (explaining that "[t]he right of
appeal is statutory, and the grant is subject to due process requirements"). One
would have believed that the violation of a statutory right to appeal would have led
to significant criticism. Although there has been some outrage expressed in legal
circles and in legal blogs, however, the general public and news outlets did not cover
the Comer v. Murphy Oil case with the same excitement, closeness, or intimacy as
cases with more shock value and commercial appeal, such as large jury verdicts and
salacious criminal trials. See sources cited infra note 87.
9. Comer, 607 F.3d at 1053-55.
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was vacated, and the district court decision was reinstated.o By
finding as it did, the en banc court accomplished two problematic
ends: (1) it, as noted, effectively took away the appellants'
statutory right to appeal;n and (2) it allowed the very judge who
recused herself to be the judge who ultimately caused the
appellants to lose their right to appeal.12  Put differently, the
judge who asserted that she could not be (or could not appear to
be) impartial enough to issue an unbiased decision was the very
one who ultimately determined the outcome of the case by
recusing herself.
The result in Murphy Oil highlights the necessity of a fair
forum. And, despite the fact that recusals are intended to ensure
a fair forum, a judge's recusal does not always guarantee a fair
forum. In fact, as Murphy Oil shows, recusals not only can fail to
guarantee fair forums, they can actually eliminate forums
altogether. Thus, recusal requirements are necessary not only for
when a judge should recuse, but also for when a judge cannot
recuse. The Murphy Oil decision underscores a larger problem:
the lack of predictability and standards in recusal rules, not only
when recusal should be obligatory, but also when it should be
prohibited. In addition, the law currently requires recusal,
without exception, in certain circumstances. Narrow exceptions
to these required recusal circumstances are necessary in order to
guarantee that no party is denied a forum.
This Article first briefly outlines the historical background of
recusals. It then discusses the odd-but certainly potentially
repeatable-procedural path of Murphy Oil, which ultimately led
to the dismissal of an appellant's victory being dismissed as if no
appeal had ever taken place, explaining why this decision was not
only unsound but also symptomatic of a much larger problem. It
next describes alternatives available to the Fifth Circuit that
would have avoided a breach of the statutory right to appeal,
including following the decision of a different circuit court with
which the Murphy Oil decision conflicts.13 Finally, it explains
10. Id. at 1056-57 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 1056 (Davis, J., dissenting).
12. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1057 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
13. Although the Fifth Circuit had alternatives, it had no legal obligation to
choose any option other than the one it did, which highlights the need for rules for
when judges cannot recuse themselves. See id. at 1056, 1059-66 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
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why these conflicting decisions illustrate the need for better
recusal standards, including standards for when judges must not
recuse themselves. Others have theorized that recusal statutes
and procedures are "systematically underused and
underenforced."14 It is not just underuse, however, that poses a
problem. Although underuse can deprive litigants of an impartial
forum, overuse can be even more problematic as it can deprive
litigants not just of an impartial forum, but any forum at all. 5
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECUSALS
Recusals have long been a part of the American judicial
landscape. In 1792, Congress passed legislation making it
necessary for judges to recuse themselves from any proceedings
in which they had an interest.'" In the early nineteenth century,
Congress clarified that it was the individual judge who made the
decision on recusal, and even then, only on the judge's own
initiative." From 1792 until the late nineteenth century, there
were some small changes in recusal rules, but no drastic
differences in the different statutory versions.' 8
Congress waited until 1911, almost 120 years after first
adopting legislation requiring recusal, to pass a statute that
permitted litigants to request recusal, rather than requiring
litigants to rely on the judicial officers to independently decide
whether to recuse themselves without any input or suggestions
from the litigants or attorneys. 9 With the 1911 legislation, later
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144, parties could finally take recusal
motions into their own hands:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge
14. Sample et al., supra note 4, at 20.
15. Although the Rule of Necessity, discussed below in Section V(C), would
seemingly alleviate any concerns of parties losing their forum, Murphy Oil
demonstrates that the Rule of Necessity is not always enough. See Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
16. See Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79; FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 2 (2002),
available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/recusal.pdf; Downing, supra note
4, at 35.
17. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; Downing, supra note 4, at 35.
18. See Downing, supra note 4, at 35.
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1090 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948));
see also Downing, supra note 4, at 36.
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before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.2 0
Although 28 U.S.C. § 144 technically allowed for parties to
move for recusal-and thus changed the longstanding tradition of
judges deciding whether to recuse themselves without any input
from the parties-courts rarely granted these motions, partly
because they were considered on the merits by the very judge
whose impartiality was being questioned.21 Moreover, parties
were understandably reluctant to even bring these motions, as
they were questioning the impartiality of a judge who was likely
to continue to hear the case and who arguably could become even
more hostile given that a party had questioned his ability to be
unbiased and unprejudiced. This, of course, further reduced the
practical availability of this technical recusal motion option.
In the fifty years after Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 144,
occasional issues with recusal requirements arose in litigation.22
During that time, the question of what constituted a bias
requiring recusal was left entirely to the judge whose impartiality
was questioned. For instance, a judge could decide to continue to
hear a case-act as an impartial arbiter-even if that judge had a
significant interest, financial or otherwise, in the case.23
Ultimately, in 1974, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 455, which
provided more explicit guidance for recusal determinations,
including a list of specific situations in which judges must recuse
themselves because bias is assumed.24 28 U.S.C. § 455, which
called for judges to recuse themselves even in the absence of a
party requesting recusal,25 complemented 28 U.S.C. § 144, which
still allowed for litigants to move for recusal.26
20. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948).
21. See David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30 U.
KAN. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1982).
22. For instance, the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. United States
ultimately held that a judge who had been asked to recuse himself first must
determine whether the motion is "legally sufficient." 255 U.S. 22, 30-32, 36 (1921).
Only if that judge (the very judge asked to recuse himself) found the motion to be
legally sufficient would he pass the merits of the motion to another judge. Id.
23. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 16, at 2.
24. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006)).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
26. Id. § 144. A third, but rarely noted or invoked, statute also governs recusals.
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28 U.S.C. § 455-the standard introduced in 1974-remains
the rule today. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) requires recusal when a judge:
1. has a personal bias about a party or has knowledge of
disputed facts;
2. served as a lawyer in the matter before reaching the bench;
3. served in governmental employment as a lawyer, adviser,
or witness or expressed some opinion on the merits of the
case while in governmental employment;
4. knows that he (or a close relative) has a financial interest
in the case; or
5. is (or a close relative is) a party in the case, is a lawyer in
the case, has an interest that could be impacted by the
case (and the judge knows this), or is likely to be a
material witness in the case (and the judge knows this).27
28 U.S.C. § 455(b) thus provides, for the most part,
unambiguous rules for when recusal is required. § 455(a) of the
same statute, however, is not so clear and straightforward;
instead, it requires judges to recuse themselves whenever
objectivity "might reasonably be questioned."28 The obvious
ambiguity in this section is at the core of many of the recusal
problems today.
When enacting § 455, Congress made clear that its purpose
was "to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judicial process."2 9 In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United
States further affirmed that the goal of recusal requirements "is
to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a
reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would
28 U.S.C. § 47 provides that a judge cannot "hear or determine an appeal from the
decision of a case or issue tried by him." This, of course, only applies in the rare
instance where an appellate judge has the opportunity to hear a case that the judge
tried. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 16, at 52-53. Thus, it would only apply in
the limited circumstances where (a) an appellate judge presided over a trial when
sitting by designation or (b) a district judge was "promoted" to the appellate level and
a recent case of that judge's is brought on appeal. Id. at 1. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 47
is rarely noted or invoked is because the same result that would be reached under
§ 47 would be reached under § 455(a). Id. at 52.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
28. Id. § 455(a).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,
6355; Hjelmfelt, supra note 21, at 259, 261.
2013] Need for Requirements for When Not to Recuse 955
give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of
partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists."30
Judges are supposed to determine whether, from an objective
perspective, they should recuse themselves rather than relying on
their subjective belief as to whether they could be fair; the
standards do not require recusal only when judges believe
themselves to be incapable of impartiality, but also require
recusal in other situations where their "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."3 ' The Fifth Circuit has been
particularly strict about enforcing recusal rules. 32  However, the
Fifth Circuit has also noted that judges must determine whether
their impartiality would be questioned by a "well-informed,
thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive,
cynical, and suspicious person."3 3 Although there is a general
consensus that the question of bias is to be considered under a
"reasonable person" standard, courts are inconsistent, both
internally and with each other, when it comes to less obvious
situations. 34
30. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (quoting Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986); see FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 16, at 6-7.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that if a judge or judge's family member is part of a class seeking monetary
damages, there is a "per se rule" that the judge must recuse himself under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4)); In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing based on the
refusal to recuse even though there was a "total absence of any showing of actual
bias").
33. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995). Along those same
lines, the Tenth Circuit has provided a list of situations that are typically not
sufficient to require recusal:
(1) Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and
similar non-factual matters; (2) the mere fact that a judge has previously
expressed an opinion on a point of law or has expressed a dedication to
upholding the law or a determination to impose severe punishment within the
limits of the law upon those found guilty of a particular offense; (3) prior rulings
in the proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they were adverse; (4)
mere familiarity with the defendant(s), or the type of charge, or kind of defense
presented; (5) baseless personal attacks on or suits against the judge by a party;
(6) reporters' personal opinions or characterizations appearing in the media,
media notoriety, and reports in the media purporting to be factual, such as
quotes attributed to the judge or others, but which are in fact false or materially
inaccurate or misleading; and (7) threats or other attempts to intimidate the
judge.
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
34. For instance, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits strongly favor recusals in close
calls. See, e.g., Republic of Pan. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989). Other circuits
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These inconsistencies have real implications. In fact, the
Supreme Court recently explained in Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co. that although most recusal issues do not have
constitutional implications, due process necessitates recusal
"when 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."'35 The
Court explained that states can require recusals even where due
process implications are not involved: "States may choose to
'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires."' 36
It is this framework behind recusal rules and the Fifth
Circuit's treatment-that recusal decisions should be based on
fairness, should promote public confidence, and should be strictly
enforced-that makes the Murphy Oil decision, especially the fact
that it technically comported with existing recusal law, so
troubling.3 7 There are no straightforward guidelines for when
judges should recuse themselves under the "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" standard; in fact, the Fifth Circuit has
confirmed this observation by stating that "each § 455(a) case is
extremely fact intensive and fact bound .... " 38 Because there is
no clear-cut guidance, there are inconsistent results. And these
inconsistent results mandate the necessity for standardized
recusal rules, including rules regarding when not to recuse.
II. COMER V. MURPHY OIL
Recusal standards are designed to promote public confidence
in the judiciary. Yet, the Fifth Circuit-unarmed with proper
standardized requirements for what recusal actions to take when
permit recusals in close calls, but do not go so far as to strongly favor them. See, e.g.,
N.Y.C. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986). Still other
circuits (and some of the ones already mentioned) hold that judges have an obligation
not to recuse themselves when the judges have no bias that is similar to the
obligation to recuse themselves when the judges do. See, e.g., Hinman v. Rogers, 831
F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
35. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872, 893 (2009) (quoting
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 37 (1975)).
36. Id. at 889-90 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 764
(2002)).
37. Although there was a time when courts and commentators believed that only
"extrajudicial sources" (sources outside the case itself) were supposed to be
considered in recusals (rather than intrajudicial sources), Liteky v. United States
made clear that "extrajudicial source" is a "common basis [for recusal], but not the
exclusive one." 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (emphasis in original).
38. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1995).
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a judge's recusal creates the opposite result of what is intended-
undercut these principles in Murphy Oil.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
In Murphy Oil, residents and landowners of property along
the Mississippi Gulf Coast filed a class action in federal district
court against a number of foreign oil and energy corporations, all
of which conducted business in Mississippi.39 The plaintiffs
claimed to own property and homes that were destroyed by high
winds, storm surge, tornadoes, and other of Hurricane Katrina's
destructive meteorological effects, effects allegedly increased in
"frequency and intensity" by the defendants' conduct.4 0
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' operations
caused greenhouse gas emissions that contributed to global
warming and ultimately magnified the impact of Hurricane
Katrina." The plaintiffs brought claims of public and private
nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.4 2 Though the allegations
were relatively complex, the three-judge Fifth Circuit panel who
first considered the appeal described them succinctly:
The plaintiffs allege that defendants' operation of energy,
39. Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA,
Inc., 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW).
40. Id. at 8, 10-11.
41. Id. at 7-10.
42. Id. at 13-19. Specifically, the bases for these different claims were as follows:
Nuisance: The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants used their property to produce
substantial greenhouse gases, causing injury to the plaintiffs and the general public
by contributing to global warming. Id. at 16-17. This increase in global warming,
the plaintiffs claimed, added to the destructive properties of Hurricane Katrina
which, in turn, destroyed the plaintiffs' property and public property in the vicinity of
the plaintiffs' property. See id. Trespass: The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants'
massive greenhouse gas production caused saltwater, debris, and other hazardous
materials to enter and remain on the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 18. Their negligence
claim consisted of allegations that the defendants breached their duty by
unreasonably endangering the environment, public health, public and private
properties, and Mississippi citizens. Id. This breach, the plaintiffs alleged, caused
property to be destroyed or damaged. See id. Unjust Enrichment: The plaintiffs
claimed that some of the defendants artificially inflated the price of petrochemicals
and, consequently, received profits that rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs. Id. at
13-14. The plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim asserted that some of the defendants
knew of the dangers of greenhouse gas emissions for years, but unlawfully
disseminated misinformation about these dangers in order to decrease public
awareness. Id. at 14-16. Fraudulent Misrepresentation: The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants made false statements in advertising campaigns in the hopes of
deflecting attention away from the dangers of global warming. Id. at 18-19.
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fossil fuels, and chemical industries in the United States
caused the emission of greenhouse gasses that contributed to
global warming, viz., the increase in global surface air and
water temperatures, that in turn caused a rise in sea levels
and added to the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina, which
combined to destroy the plaintiffs' private property, as well
as public property useful to them.4 3
At the district court level, the defendants moved to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing
and that the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.4 4
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss from
the bench without a written opinion.45 From the bench, the court
explained that the plaintiffs' complaint sought to have "this court
do what Baker v. Carr told me not to do, and that is to balance
economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests and make an initial policy determination of a kind
which is simply nonjudicial."4 6 The district court concluded that
"[t]hese policy decisions are best left to the executive and
legislative branches of the government, who are not only in the
best position to make those decisions but are constitutionally
empowered to do so."4 7
B. THE APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fifth Circuit three-judge
panel-consisting of Judges Davis, Stewart, and Dennis-
disagreed with the district court, holding that the plaintiffs had
pled sufficient facts to establish standing for all but three of their
claims and that the claims did not present nonjusticiable political
questions.4 8 The defendants then petitioned for en banc
consideration. Four months after the three-judge panel decision,
nine Fifth Circuit judges-six new to the case (Jolly, Smith,
Clement, Prado, Owen, and Elrod) and the original three in the
three-judge panel (Davis, Stewart, and Dennis)-issued an order
43. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g en banc
granted by 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir.
2010).
44. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL
6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
45. See id.; Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2.
46. Comer, 585 F.3d at 860 n.2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 859, 879-80.
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for a hearing en banc.4 9
En banc consideration of a case is, by the Fifth Circuit's own
internal operating procedures, "an extraordinary procedure that
is intended to bring to the attention of the entire court" "a
precedent-setting error of exceptional public importance or an
opinion which directly conflicts with prior Supreme Court [or]
Fifth Circuit precedent."5 o Put another way, en banc
consideration is an extraordinary procedure limited only to
particularly important cases; so, the very decision to give en banc
consideration of the case demonstrates that the court found the
decision particularly significant.
Despite the court's acknowledgement that the case was
either exceptionally important or directly in conflict with
precedent, the court ultimately failed to provide any guidance on
the case. Rather, as discussed below, the lack of standardized
recusal guidelines resulted in the court exploiting a procedural
loophole arising from a judge's choice to recuse herself, which
allowed the court to avoid consideration of the merits of the
appeal entirely.
The court's order granting an en banc hearing automatically
vacated the three-judge panel's decision and stayed the
mandate.5' Thus, at the time of the announcement that the court
would hold an en banc hearing, the dismissal from the district
court stood, pending the decision from the en banc court.
Essentially, for all practical purposes, it was as if the three-judge
panel had never issued a decision.
C. THE EN BANC DECISION
On May 28, 2010, just two months after the Fifth Circuit's
February 26, 2010 order granting en banc consideration, the en
banc court issued its decision.5 2 In the two months between the
decision to hear the case en banc and the en banc court's ruling,
49. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). Judges Jones,
King, Wiener, Garza, Benavides, Southwick, and Haynes were recused and did not
participate in the vote to hear the case en banc. Id. at 210 n.1.
50. See 5TH CIR. R. 35 I.O.P.; United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Gonzalez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 773 F.2d 637, 641 (5th Cir. 1985))
(explaining that en banc consideration is limited to exceptional circumstances).
51. See 5TH CIR. R. 41.3.; see, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 293 (5th
Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
52. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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Judge Elrod had a conflict arise.53 Judge Elrod, who was part of
the en banc court that granted rehearing, recused herself at some
point after voting on whether to hear the case en banc." Because
of Judge Elrod's recusal, the en banc panel did not consider the
merits.55
Specifically, the en banc court held that, because there was
not a quorum once Judge Elrod recused herself, the court could
not conduct judicial business on this case.5 6 The en banc court
explained:
After the en banc court was properly constituted, new
circumstances arose that caused the disqualification and
recusal of one of the nine judges, leaving only eight judges in
regular active service, on a court of sixteen judges, who are
not disqualified in this en banc case. Upon this recusal, this
en banc court lost its quorum. Absent a quorum, no court is
authorized to transact judicial business.5 7
In so ruling, the en banc Murphy Oil court stressed that it
relied on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure which provide, in
pertinent part, that "a majority of the circuit judges who are in
regular active service and who are not disqualified may order
that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the
court of appeals en banc."68 . In doing so, the en banc court
summarily rejected a number of options, any of which would have
allowed the court to consider the case on the merits."
53. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
54. See id. at 1053 n.*. It is worth noting that nothing in this Article is intended
to imply that Judge Elrod-or any judge-acted inappropriately or intended to
improperly influence the decision. In fact, Judge Elrod obviously did not
intentionally influence the decision, or she would not have recused herself in the first
place.
55. Id. at 1053-55.
56. Id. at 1053-54. Judges Jolly, Davis, Smith, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado,
and Owen joined the en banc decision. Id. at 1053. Judges Davis, Stewart, and
Dennis-the judges who were on the three-judge panel-dissented. Id. at 1055.
57. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(emphasis added) (citing Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 n.14 (2003)).
58. Id. at 1054; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006); FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
59. The en banc court listed these rejected possibilities, dismissing each without
significant discussion: appointing another judge from a different circuit; declaring
there is a quorum under FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); adopting the Rule of Necessity;
holding the case in abeyance; and "dis-enbancing." Comer, 607 F.3d at 1054.
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Because the en banc court found itself unable to conduct
judicial business only after it vacated the three-judge panel
decision, it held that it could not reinstate the three-judge panel's
decision.60 In effect, by refusing to conduct business after the
recusal, the en banc court actually reversed the three-judge panel
decision and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the lawsuit.
In a final sentence-perhaps in an attempt to thwart criticism
that, for all practical purposes, the court had taken away the
appellants' right to appeal-the en banc court stated simply: "The
parties, of course, now have the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States.""
III. ARNOLD V. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.
The Fifth Circuit was not the first court to face the issue of a
recusal after voting on an en banc petition. The Fifth Circuit
was, however, the first-though, perhaps not the last, absent new
uniform recusal requirements-whose resolution foreclosed any
real chance at appeal. In Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., the
60. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
61. Id. at 1055. Though this may be true, a petition to the United States
Supreme Court has little chance of being granted as a practical matter. Thus,
although the en banc court could correctly state that no right to appeal was
absolutely denied, it certainly was effectively denied. In a typical year, the Supreme
Court receives in excess of 10,000 petitions, but only hears about 100 oral arguments
(in addition to issuing approximately fifty to sixty opinions without oral argument).
See About the Court: The Justices' Caseload, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). Thus, the chance of
receiving Supreme Court review of any type is less than 2%. See id. Ultimately, the
Fifth Circuit amended its rules to ensure that the exact scenario from Murphy Oil
does not repeat itself. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas:
Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 368 n.60
(2011). The court amended its rules so that, if it takes a case en banc, but then later
lacks a quorum to decide the case en banc, the case returns to the original three-
judge panel, the mandate is reinstated, and the opinion is issued as an unpublished
opinion. The amendment to Circuit Rule 41.3 added the following language:
If, after voting a case en banc, the court lacks a quorum to act on the case for 30
consecutive days, the case is automatically returned to the panel, the panel
opinion is reinstated as an unpublished (and hence nonprecedential) opinion,
and the mandate is released. To act on a case, the en banc court must have a
quorum consisting of a majority of the en banc court as defined in 28 U.S.C. §
46(c).
5TH CIR. R. 41.3. Had this rule been in place at the time of Murphy Oil, the result
would have been different. So, this amendment would alleviate the problem in that
exact circumstance. But, while it treats the specific symptoms of Murphy Oil, it does
not treat the larger-and more important-underlying disease: the lack of guidance
for when judges should not recuse. Moreover, the rule only exists in the Fifth
Circuit, meaning the Murphy Oil problem could arise again elsewhere. See id.
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United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina consolidated several actions arising out of an Eastern
Air Lines crash in Charlotte, North Carolina in 1974.62 The three
plaintiffs were all awarded damages at the district court trial.6 3
A three-judge panel heard the appeal. The panel affirmed
judgments for the plaintiffs in two of the cases and reversed and
remanded the third case for a new trial on a sub-issue of
compensatory damages. 64 Eastern Air Lines petitioned for an en
banc rehearing, contesting the two affirmed judgments. 6 At the
time of voting on the en banc petition, there were ten judges in
active service.6 6  Of the ten active judges, five voted in favor of
rehearing, four voted against rehearing, and one recused
himself.67
Before considering the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit
en banc court considered whether the case had actually achieved
the status of entitlement to en banc rehearing." The Fourth
Circuit also considered what constitutes a quorum, allowing a
court to properly transact business.6 ' Like the Murphy Oil en
banc court, the Arnold court considered the plain language of 28
U.S.C. § 46(c). 70  The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) states:
"Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a
court or panel of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or
rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the
circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service."n
The Arnold court focused on the "in regular active service" phrase
of § 46(c), holding that "without any contrary indication from a
rule or regulation, than that there shall be excluded, for quorum
ascertainment purposes, any disqualified judge when a vote on a
62. Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 1982). The
substantive specifics of the district court trial and three-judge panel appeal are not
important to the procedural posture. Briefly, however, two surviving passengers as
well as the personal representative of one deceased passenger brought suit. Id.
Eastern Airlines appealed the award of about $5 million in damages. Id.
63. See id.
64. See Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 902 (4th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 902.
69. See Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 903-04, 905 (4th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
70. Id. at 903.
71. Id.
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suggestion for hearing or rehearing en banc takes place."
Simply, the Fourth Circuit held that, for purposes of ascertaining
a quorum, judges who are disqualified when a vote for a petition
for hearing or rehearing en banc takes place (even if those judges
are available at the time of petition, but not at rehearing) should
be excluded; thus, regular, active members of a court who recuse
or disqualify themselves do not count in the calculation of a
quorum for that case. 73
The Arnold court reasoned that the court, sitting en banc,
could not have among it in active service judges who had recused
themselves.7 4 The court explained that judges who recuse
themselves are out of service for that particular case." As the
court stated, "should [a judge], or any other regular, active
member of the court, recuse or disqualify himself at any time, he
is out of service insofar as that particular case is concerned" and
necessarily could not be considered in service." Accordingly, the
Arnold court proceeded to hear the case en banc, ultimately
ruling on the merits by reversing and remanding the district
court's decision.
Faced with the same issue on whether a court had a quorum
after a judge's recusal, the Murphy Oil and Arnold courts came to
opposite conclusions. Although their conclusions were different,
both decisions are permissible-though not both ideal-under
recusal rules as they currently stand, illustrating that a change
to recusal rules is necessary.
IV. THE CONFLICTING OPINIONS SHOW THE NEED
FOR MORE STANDARDIZED RECUSAL
REQUIREMENTS78
As Murphy Oil illustrates, recused judges can sway-if not
dispositively decide-the very cases from which they have
recused themselves under current recusal rules. Additionally,
72. Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 903-04, 905 (4th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
73. See id. at 903-04.
74. Id. at 905.
75. Id. at 904.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
78. They also show the need for more standardized quorum rules, but that is a
question for another day.
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Murphy Oil also ignores the purpose behind the statutory
definition of a quorum. While the Arnold decision avoided both of
these issues by ruling as it did, the fact that the Murphy Oil
outcome is possible highlights the importance of further recusal
requirements.
A. CURRENT RECUSAL LAWS ALLOW A RECUSED JUDGE TO
DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF A CASE
Though a judge's neutrality-actual or reasonably
perceived-is always important, neutrality is paramount when a
judge has a particularly significant impact on the outcome of the
case. Murphy Oil provides one example of a judge's actions
impacting the outcome. The appellants in Murphy Oil-who had
reason to believe their position had merit given that the three-
judge panel agreed with them-effectively lost their right to
appeal altogether as the result of the actions of an admittedly
biased judge,79 in direct contravention of the very purposes
behind the recusal statutes." Courts need a standardized
approach to recusals, one that would never allow a recused judge
to intentionally-or unintentionally-decide the ultimate issue.
It is true that a party's right to appeal from a circuit court
decision is actually not entirely lost because the United States
Supreme Court can still consider the issue. But, as discussed
above, the United States Supreme Court considers an incredibly
small percentage of appeals on the merits."1 Thus, the odds of
appellate review, once the intermediate appellate court
79. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Davis, J., dissenting). Of course, as I note below, I make absolutely no suggestion
that the judge who recused herself-Judge Elrod--did anything to intentionally
impact the decision. She was, of course, acting entirely properly in recusing herself
under the current rules and did not know her decision to recuse herself would result
in the appellants effectively losing their right to appeal.
80. This is exactly the circumstance that the Fourth Circuit warned against when
it stated, in what seemed an obvious point at the time: "Patently a judge who is
disqualified from acting must not be able to affect the determination of any cause
from which he is barred." Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir.
1983) (per curiam).
81. In fact, the Supreme Court grants oral argument in less than one percent of
the cases appealed to it. See Frequently Asked Questions, SUP. CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) ('The Court receives
approximately 10,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each year. The Court grants
and hears oral argument in about 75-80 cases."); see also supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
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completely exits the picture, are extremely low. 82 Consequently,
although the Murphy Oil plaintiffs may not have wholly lost their
right to appeal as a technical matter, that right was certainly
drastically diminished, if not lost, for all practical purposes. And,
the right was drastically diminished because one judge-a judge
who admits by her actions to have a bias or at least the
perception of one-first voted to consider the case en banc, but
then decided not to sit on the en banc court.
A biased or potentially biased judge's actions should not be
permitted to decide a case. But, that is exactly what happened in
Murphy Oil when one judge voted on whether the en banc
rehearing would take place, and then that same judge later
determined that she could not consider the case, which caused the
dismissal of the case and the judgment of the lower court to be
reinstated even after being vacated by the three-judge panel.
Because there are no clear guidelines or rules for when judges
should not or cannot recuse themselves, this result is perfectly
permissible, even if not rationally sound or consistent with the
purpose of the recusal rules.
As previously noted, the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 455, which
requires a judge to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned" 83 is not to undercut
judicial and appellate review, but rather to ensure that, when a
judge recuses himself, he could either be replaced by another
judge or the remaining judges could consider the case.8 4 28
U.S.C. § 455 is not intended to allow for a recusal to limit the
82. Here, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus on August 26, 2010.
See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011) (No. 10-294),
2010 WL 3493195. Acting United States Solicitor General, Neal Katyal, opposed the
petition on November 29, 2010, further minimizing the chance of actual appellate
review. See Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority in Opposition, In re Comer, 131
S. Ct. 902 (No. 10-294), 2010 WL 4876469. And, the United States Supreme Court
denied the petition on January 10, 2011. In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011) (mem.).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 225
(5th Cir. 1988).
84. Excerpts from the House and Senate Reports make this clear. For example:
"[I]f there is [any] reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he
should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the case." H.R. REP. No.
93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355 (emphasis added); S.
REP. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973) (emphasis added). "The statutes contain ample
authority for chief judges to assign other judges to replace either a circuit or district
court judge who become disqualified [under § 455]." H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 7,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6357 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 93-419, at 7
(emphasis added).
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availability of appellate or en banc review.
More, "[t]he goal of the disqualification statute is to promote
public confidence in the judicial system by avoiding even the
appearance of partiality."ss Thus, the Murphy Oil en banc
decision, even if technically permissible, undercuts the purpose
behind the recusal procedure. The purpose is to maintain public
confidence in the judicial system, but the decision did just the
opposite. A Google search provides a number of outlets that
expressed outrage over the decision." At least one blogger
accused the court of "carefully tim[ing] for late Friday release on
Memorial Day Weekend. . . [an] unbelievable decision."" That
same blogger expressed the sentiment that others shared: "Just
when you think you can't be any more appalled, you're more
appalled. What a sorry stunt.""
The reaction is unsurprising: a court announced that it could
not consider a case because there were too few judges to provide
an impartial review, but simultaneously rendered a decision that,
for all practical purposes, overturned the previous appellate
decision ." Judge Elrod did not (and was not required to) explain
the reason behind her recusal, but, by definition, she either had
an actual conflict or apparent conflict. Despite Judge Elrod's
apparent or actual partiality that was so great as to prod her to
recuse herself, her recusal-a procedural safeguard aimed at
keeping a partial judge from impacting a case-unwittingly, but
dispositively, decided not only the Murphy Oil appellants'
substantive appeal, but effectively the Murphy Oil appellants'
procedural right to appeal.
85. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted), aff'd, 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
86. See, e.g., Steven M. Taber, Fifth Circuit Punts on Comer v. Murphy Oil
Appeal-Dismisses on Procedural Grounds, Not Merits, ENvTL. L. & CLIMATE CHANGE
L. BLOG (June 4, 2010), http://taberlaw.wordpress.com/2010/06/04/fifth-circuit-punts-
on-comer-v-murphy-oil-appeal-dismisses-appeal-on-procedural-grounds-not-merits/;
A miscarriage of justice, THUS BLOGGED ANDERSON (May 29, 2010),
http://thusbloggedanderson.blogspot.com/2010/05/judicial-depravity.html, reprinted
in Fifth Circuit's dip stick decision not to decide Comer v. Murphy Oil, SLABBED (May
31, 2010), http://www.slabbed.org/2010/05/31/fifth-circuits-dip-stick-decision-not-to-
decide-comer-v-murphy-oill.
87. A miscarriage of justice, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. See generally Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). Although it actually vacated the decision rather than overturned it, the
practical impact on the appellants remains the same.
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B. MURPHY OIL IGNORES THE PURPOSE BEHIND 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(C)
Although not the primary focus, this Article would be remiss
if it did not point out that the Murphy Oil decision not only
ignores the purpose of recusal, but also ignores (without actually
violating) the plain language and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) defines an en banc court as follows: "A court
in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active
service.""o There is no mention of the entire court, consisting of
all judges; rather there is mention of the judges in regular active
service. The Murphy Oil en banc panel, however, interprets 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) as requiring a "majority of the judges of the entire
court who are in regular active service, and not as a body of the
non-recused judges of the court, however few," to constitute a
quorum to conduct judicial business."91 Thus, after Judge Elrod
recused herself, the Fifth Circuit was without a majority of the
sixteen judges that sit on the court. Reading 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) as
requiring a majority of the entire court to hear or rehear en banc
cases is contrary to the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2005
amendment to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) that
defines when a hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered: "It
is clear that 'all circuit judges in regular active service' in the
second sentence [of § 46(c)] does not include disqualified judges,
as disqualified judges clearly cannot participate in a case being
heard or reheard en banc."92
Moreover, the Murphy Oil en banc court's decision ignored
principles of fairness. The en banc court had alternative options
after ruling that it lacked a quorum, such as finding another
judge, using some other procedural rule, 93 or ruling that it could
not render a decision, meaning the panel decision stood.
Alternatively, it could have ruled that it had a quorum-and then
ruled on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit view-that "regular active service"
90. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006).
91. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en bane)
(emphasis added).
92. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) advisory committee's note to 2005 Amendments, quoted
in Comer, 607 F.3d at 1058 n.3 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
93. For example, the court could have invoked the Rule of Necessity, discussed
below in Section V(C).
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means only those judges who are not barred from considering a
particular case-is, if nothing else, more evenhanded than the
Fifth Circuit's view-that "regular active service" refers to every
judge who serves on active duty on the court. Although certainly
not all cases will result in the panel's decision being vacated
merely because of a single judge's recusal, the fact that it can
happen (and has happened) illustrates the problem with the Fifth
Circuit's approach and an even bigger problem with recusal law
as it now stands: a judge who refuses to consider the case because
of either an actual or a perceived bias can be the very judge who
determines the ultimate result, even when that judge does not
officially cast a vote on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit's view is also more logical; the majority of
the active judges are needed to consider a case en banc. 94 An
inactive judge, whether this inactivity is the result of recusal or
something else, should not be in active service. And as the
Murphy Oil en banc dissent aptly notes, if all judges in regular
active service included judges who were disqualified from a
certain case, then "the statute would necessarily require all
disqualified active judges to sit as part of the en banc court in
every case that is heard or reheard en banc."95
Although the Fourth Circuit's rationale may be more logical
and fair, the Fifth Circuit rationale is equally permissible given
the current state of recusal law. And, it is precisely for that
reason that additional safeguards are necessary.
V. RECUSAL REFORM (INCLUDING WHEN NOT TO
RECUSE) IS NECESSARY
Others have noted the need for more systematic or concrete
recusal rules and guidelines.96 Those who have considered the
need for recusal reform have provided a litany of options and
proposals that would purportedly be better than the rules
currently in place. Just a few of those proposals include:
peremptory challenges of judges, 97 per se recusal rules for
94. See Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 901-02 (4th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
95. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1058 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Downing, supra note 4, at 44-46; Sample et al., supra note 4, at 5-7.
97. Sample et al., supra note 4, at 5, 26-27.
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campaign contributors,9 8  independent adjudication of
disqualification motions, 99 de novo review on interlocutory appeal
of a refusal to recuse, 00 recusal advisory boards,101 enhanced
disclosure by litigants,102 and required written opinions when a
judge denies a motion to recuse.103
As recently as March 17, 2011, a letter sent to the Chairmen
and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees by over 100 law school professors and
deans around the country highlighted the need for a "nonpartisan
call for the implementation of mandatory and enforceable rules to
protect the integrity of the Supreme Court."104 Although that
letter was targeted at Supreme Court justices, one of its points is
particularly relevant for courts of all levels:
The impartiality of justices, and, as a result, the integrity of
the Supreme Court, has come under question because the
primary recusal statute - 28 U.S.C. § 455 - fails to meet this
standard for Supreme Court justices. On recusal motions,
justices may sit in silent judgment of their own impartiality,
with no opportunity for review, even though the standard to
be applied is the appearance of bias, which by necessity
depends on the views of others. 05
These academics had a major concern that "there is no
review procedure for recusal decisions by Supreme Court
justices."' Ultimately, that letter suggested that the Supreme
Court needs to take the following steps:
1. Apply the Code of Conduct for United States Judges to
Supreme Court justices;
2. Establish a set of procedures to enforce the Code's
standards as applied to Supreme Court justices;
98. Sample et al., supra note 4, at 6, 29-30.
99. Id. at 6, 31-32.
100. Id. at 6, 33.
101. Id. at 7, 34-35.
102. See Setting Recusal Standards After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, New York, N.Y.), July 16,
2009, at 6, available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/a6252cfel6365afbb9_sim6bxrdd.pdf.
103. See Letter on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules, supra note 4, at 3.
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
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3. Require a written opinion when a Supreme Court justice
denies a motion to recuse; and
4. Determine a procedure, or require the Court to do so, that
provides for review of a decision by a Supreme Court
justice not to recuse himself or herself from a case pending
before the Court. 107
Every one of the above proposals has merit, but the
proposals do not go far enough. They are limited to providing
standards and guidelines to when judges must recuse themselves,
not when judges must not recuse themselves.10 8  For instance,
rather than limiting the need for a written opinion and procedure
when a judge denies a motion to recuse, as suggested in the
March 17, 2011 letter, the judge should also be required to write
a written opinion when a judge grants a motion to recuse, since-
as Murphy Oil shows us-recusal can be just as detrimental to
the litigants as failure to recuse.
A. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT AND COURTS OF APPEALS WHEN IT
COMES TO RECUSALS IS NO DISTINCTION AT ALL
In Cheney v. United States District Court, Justice Scalia
considered-and denied-a motion for his recusal. 09 In Cheney, a
public interest law firm and the Sierra Club brought suit against
the National Energy Policy Development Group and some of its
individual members, including Richard B. Cheney, then the Vice
President of the United States.110 After the district court denied
Vice President Cheney's motion to dismiss, Cheney filed an
interlocutory appeal petitioning for a writ of mandamus vacating
discovery orders and requiring the lower court to dismiss him.'
After the D.C. Circuit dismissed Vice President Cheney's petition
107. Letter on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules, supra note 4, at 2-3.
108. In addition, the March 17, 2011 nonpartisan call for reform limits itself to
Supreme Court Justices because they "are not subject to a comprehensive code of
judicial ethics." Letter on Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules, supra note 4, at 1.
Although this distinction makes the need for reform at the Supreme Court level
particularly necessary, there is no reason that standards and guidelines should not
apply at all levels.
109. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
110. See id. at 913-14, 917-18; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy
Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2002).
111. Judicial Watch, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 23-24; see In re Cheney, 334 F.3d
1096, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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and interlocutory appeal, the Vice President's motion reached the
United States Supreme Court.1 1 2  The Sierra Club moved to
recuse Justice Scalia based on his well-documented friendship
with Vice President Cheney, which included guest seats on the
Vice President's government airplane when they went on a
hunting trip together.1 13 Scalia denied the Sierra Club's motion
to recuse him, taking the somewhat unusual step of providing a
written memorandum explaining his rationale in doing so." 4 In
the written denial, Scalia went to great lengths in explaining why
his friendship with Vice President Cheney (including the seats on
the plane) would not impact his impartiality. 115
Of particular note here is that part of Scalia's overall
analysis for why a motion to recuse a Supreme Court justice
contains peculiar consideration that is unique to that Court.116
Scalia rejected the argument that he should "resolve any doubts
in favor of recusal" for (particularly when considering Murphy
Oil) an interesting reason:
That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of
Appeals. There, my place would be taken by another judge,
and the case would proceed normally. On the Supreme
Court, however, the consequence is different: The Court
proceeds with eight Justices, raising the possibility that, by
reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to resolve the
significant legal issue presented by the case.' 17
Despite Scalia's contention, however, Murphy Oil-which the
Fifth Circuit decided after Scalia's memorandum-shows that it
is not always the case that an appellate court judge's "place would
be taken by another judge, and the case would proceed
112. See In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Motion to Recuse
at 1, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03-475), 2004 WL 3741418,
at *2.
113. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 920-23; Motion to Recuse, supra note 112, at *6.
114. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
115. Id. at 916-22. Scalia seemed to ignore the question of whether his
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Presumably, it could "reasonably be
questioned," as the Sierra Club argued-and Scalia acknowledged-that a
"significant portion of the press, which is deemed to be the American public,
demands [recusal]." See id. at 922-23.
116. I intentionally do not consider the merits of Scalia's position here. The focus
here is not to approve or disapprove of any particular judge's decision on recusal, but
rather to demonstrate the larger problem that there is inadequate guidance.
117. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (internal citations omitted).
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normally." 1 8 Thus, after Murphy Oil, and even after the rules
adopted by the Fifth Circuit, there is no reason why appellate
courts should have more (or less) stringent recusal requirements
than the United States Supreme Court.
B. CONSISTENT GUIDELINES ARE NECESSARY; THEY MUST
REQUIRE THAT A JUDGE CANNOT, ABSENT EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES, INFLUENCE ANY PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE
JUDGE IS INTERESTED
Standardized recusal requirements are essential. There is
no reason why recusal rules should be limited to providing
instances where judges either should or must recuse themselves.
The rules must similarly allow for instances where judges either
should not-or cannot-recuse themselves.
The requirements for when not to recuse would share a
number of traits in common with when to recuse; in many ways,
they would be the inverse of each other. But, the rules governing
recusals, rather than refusals to recuse, would have additional
requirements. The fundamental principle behind a rule requiring
judges not to disqualify themselves must be that the judges must
minimize any influence on any proceedings where they are-or
could be perceived to be-interested, unless the parties consent.
Whether a judge granted or denied a motion to recuse, that judge
would be required to issue a written opinion on that decision. In
addition, there must be an independent review of any denial of a
recusal motion or any decision to recuse. This independent
review could be performed either by a panel of non-judicial legal
professionals or by a panel of disinterested judges. The
independent review panel would examine the written opinion
provided by judges who either refused to recuse themselves or did
recuse themselves, as a written opinion would be required.
Ultimately, the independent review panel would have to be
governed by a specific set of guidelines that the panel could not
ignore. This would be more stringent than the recusal statutes.
Of particular note, one of the cornerstones would be that a judge
could not, absent extraordinary circumstances, adversely impact
a party or influence proceedings in which the judge is biased or
apparently biased. So, if a recusal would result in dismissal-as
was the case in Murphy Oil-then the judge would be required to
118. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004). See generally Comer
v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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"unrecuse."119
The need for standardized requirements is increasingly
necessary as society becomes increasingly globalized. Judges are
more and more likely to have some sort of interest in an
increasing number of cases, and thus a lack of standardized rules
for when judges cannot recuse themselves could result in a lack of
judges in certain cases. For instance, it would be difficult to
imagine finding judges with absolutely no interest in litigation
involving certain credit cards or computer software.
In addition, there is no reason why the most common recusal
statute should remain written as is. Right now, 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b) sets out specific factual instances when a judge "shall
disqualify himself." But, there are times when justice requires
that the judges not recuse themselves, even under one of the
currently mandatory reasons for recusal; Murphy Oil makes this
very clear. Either rewriting or creating an exception to the
statute to account for this situation is necessary.
C. ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF ANY STANDARDIZED SET OF
RECUSAL RULES MUST BE THAT A LITIGANT CANNOT BE DENIED
A FORUM
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss every single
aspect of a different set of recusal rules, but one thing is clear: in
order to avoid a situation where a judge's recusal can impact a
litigant's rights or position, any uniform recusal rules must
require a judge to consider a case, even if the judge has an
interest in the case, if the judge's disqualification would mean the
case could not otherwise be heard. Thus, the courts would invoke
the Rule of Necessity, which always (should) trumps any recusal
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 455.120
The Supreme Court has explained that there are procedural
safeguards to allow judicial review in most circumstances, but in
certain circumstances the Rule of Necessity is needed.1 2 1 The
119. Of course, if a judge "unrecuses," the judge has the potential to still influence
the outcome. Although influencing the outcome is less than perfect, it is better than
being denied a forum altogether.
120. In United States v. Will, the Supreme Court held that § 455 did not change
the Rule of Necessity. 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980). However, the Murphy Oil decision
shows that the Rule of Necessity has not always trumped § 455. See Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
121. Will, 449 U.S. at 217.
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Rule of Necessity is "a well-settled principle at common law" that
provides that "although a judge had better not, if it can be
avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any
personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case
cannot be heard otherwise."122 Various courts throughout the
country have explained that the Rule of Necessity requires a
judge to consider a case when the failure to do so would deny a
litigant's right to a day in court.'2 3 Although the Rule of
Necessity is occasionally invoked, 12 4 it is not invoked consistently
or in every situation that it should be invoked,'2 5 likely because
the need for it is rare and, like recusal standards, there is not
adequate guidance on its use. The Murphy Oil plaintiffs surely
would have wanted the Fifth Circuit to invoke the Rule of
Necessity, and the fact that the court chose not to do so
demonstrates that the Rule of Necessity as it now stands is not
enough to fix the problems and fill in the gaps that now exist in
the recusal standards. Standardized recusal requirements would
help to keep courts from ignoring the Rule of Necessity, as they
currently can do.' 26
122. Id. at 213 (quoting F. POLLACK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th
ed. 1929)).
123. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 143 P.2d 652, 656 (Kan.
1943) ("[Ilt is well established that actual disqualification of a member of a court of
last resort will not excuse such member from performing his official duty if failure to
do so would result in a denial of a litigant's constitutional right to have a question,
properly presented to such court, adjudicated."); City of Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa.
169, 185 (Penn. 1870) ("The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes
necessary for a judge to sit even where he has an interest-where no provision is
made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his place-it is his duty to
hear and decide, however disagreeable it may be.").
124. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1980) (explaining that
the Rule of Necessity is supposed to prohibit recusal if the case would not otherwise
be heard); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The rule of necessity
is generally invoked in cases in which no judge in the country is capable of hearing
the case."); Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000); Tapia-Ortiz v.
Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Petition to Inspect & Copy Grand Jury
Materials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1984).
125. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1057 (5th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting); Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1238-39.
126. Of course, in the Murphy Oil context, the Rule of Necessity was not the only
solution, but merely one of many possible solutions. See Comer, 607 F.3d at 1054.
Whether it is the invocation of the Rule of Necessity, the appointment of a judge
sitting by designation, "dis-enbancing" the panel so that the three-judge panel's
decision was not vacated, or the transfer to another appellate court, any solution that
allows for appellate review is preferable to one that does not. Murphy Oil was
particularly problematic because the en banc decision affirmed the district court's
opinion, meaning the judicial process ended (other than the longshot possibility of
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Judge Elrod did not explain her reasons for recusal in
Murphy Oil, nor did she have any obligation to do so. Under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), a party may waive grounds for disqualification of
a judge "provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record
of the basis for disqualification."1 2 7 Conversely, a party cannot
waive "any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection
[28 U.S.C. § 455](b)."128 The rationale behind this is, at first
blush, logical: § 455(a) only deals with situations where
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," whereas § 455(b)
provides a number of situations where impartiality is presumed.
Still, courts have warned against accepting waivers of even
permissible areas under § 455(a).12 9 There is no reason, however,
why parties should be unable to determine whether judges should
recuse themselves. If the party against whom a judge is either
actually or apparently biased agrees that the judge can act as an
impartial arbiter, then that judge should be able to consider the
case. The Murphy Oil appellants were not given this opportunity;
surely, were they given the option of waiving any need for
disqualification, they would have preferred that to a dismissal at
the hands of the disqualified judge, particularly in an en banc
situation, where a single judge's influence is more limited than in
a regular three-panel review. Accordingly, any standard should
include the possibility of parties waiving grounds for
disqualification both when a judge's "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" and under the circumstances
enumerated in § 455(b). Simply, a party should be given the
opportunity to have a potentially partial judge instead of having
no judge at all.
Supreme Court review, which, of course, ended when the Supreme Court denied the
appellant's petition); if the en banc review had resulted in a remand to the district
court, at least the judicial proceedings would have continued. See Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting); In
re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011) (mem.). The Murphy Oil solution (or problem),
however, is not the primary focus of this Article, nor should it be the primary
concern; rather, the primary focus should be on the bigger problem: that lack of
recusal standards permitted the Fifth Circuit to, for all practical purposes, deny the
right to appellate review.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (2006).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Under 28
U.S.C.A. § 455, '[w]here the ground for disqualification arises only under [section
455(a)], waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the
record of the basis for disqualification.' While it is thus permissible for a judge to
accept a waiver of recusal, we believe this option should be limited to marginal cases
and should be exercised with the utmost restraint.").
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CONCLUSION
It bears repeating that, of course, nothing here is meant to
suggest that Judge Elrod intentionally influenced the Murphy Oil
decision. In fact, the very notion that she could have done so
contradicts the fundamental premise of this Article. Because the
Fifth Circuit's decision was unpredictable, there is simply no way
that Judge Elrod could have anticipated such a result. And that
is exactly why the recusal rules need to be more standardized: not
only can litigants not predict when judges will recuse themselves,
judges themselves cannot predict what impact their recusals will
have. Rather than acting improperly, Judge Elrod recused
herself precisely so that she did not influence the decision. In
direct contradiction of her intention, however, her recusal not
only influenced the decision, but ultimately dispositively decided
it.
The Murphy Oil en banc court held that it lacked a quorum
and, therefore, could not decide the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 46.
But, despite the contention that the en banc panel lacked the
authority to decide the appeal, it essentially decided the appeal
by dismissing it. None of the rules of civil or appellate procedure
or statutes intended-or are written in a way that demands-the
Murphy Oil course of action. But, they do allow it. After Judge
Elrod recused herself, the Fifth Circuit ignored the basic tenet
that courts are not permitted to abstain from deciding cases on
which jurisdiction has been conferred.1 30 The Murphy Oil en banc
court relied on a procedural loophole to ignore its "absolute duty"
to hear and decide the case.13 1 A standardized and predictable set
of recusal rules that prohibit a recusal from adversely impacting
the intended beneficiary would alleviate any such
inconsistencies. 132
130. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
358 (1989) ("[F]ederal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of
jurisdiction that has been conferred.").
131. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc);
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 215 (1980) (discussing "the absolute duty of
judges to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction").
132. Some would no doubt argue that, in the future, this result is unlikely.
Judges, unless intentionally hoping to improperly influence a decision (an unlikely
situation), will either be more likely to recuse themselves earlier (even if potentially
unnecessary) or less likely to vote for an en banc hearing, neither of which are ideal
alternatives. At least these options, though, would not entirely eliminate circuit-
level appellate review. Although this result is unlikely in the future, some safeguard
needs to be put in place in order to eliminate the Murphy Oil problem from
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The twenty-seven-year gap between the Arnold decision in
1983 and the Murpy Oil decision in 2010 shows that the issue of
how a recusal will impact an appellate court's en banc quorum
does not arise often, but the fact that it has happened twice
within a relatively short time-frame shows that it can (and does)
happen.133 And when it does, the implications are serious and
concerning. A standardized set of rules for when judges cannot
recuse themselves is necessary.
eliminating appellate review again-standardized recusal requirements, including
requirements for when not to recuse, would provide that safeguard.
133. There are surely other situations where a judge's recusal could improperly
impact litigation. Although they are difficult to predict or imagine, so too was
Murphy Oil.
